Browsing by Author "Duman, Musa"

Now showing 1 - 3 of 3

Hiç, metafizik, nihilizm
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2009) Duman, Musa
Bu makalede, Heidegger’in nihilizmi metafiziğin, metafiziksel Varlık deneyiminin, özsel boyutu olarak kavrayışını tetkik ediyor, ve akabinde, bu olguya Heidegger’in ne tür karşılıklar verdiğini ele alıyoruz. Heidegger nihilizmi metafiziksel düşünme biçimi içinde köklenmiş olarak düşünür, bu nedenledir ki metafizik ve nihilizm asli bir özdeşlik arzederler. Çerçevesi içerisinde Varlık’ın, açık veya örtük olarak, sanattan bilime, Batı kültürünün tüm sahalarında, deneyimlenip, ifadelendirildiği bu düşünme biçimi bize Batı geleneğinin derin tarihini ya da hareketini vermektedir. Nihilizm metafizik için esas olan varolanlara dayalı düşünüşün hükümranlığından neşet eder. Bu ise, Hiç’in, gizlenme boyutu olarak, asli bir unsuru olduğu Varlık’ın gizlenme-açılmaya dayalı karakterinin (hakikati) kaybedilmesini beraberinde getirir.
Popper and the theory of evolution
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2011) Duman, Musa
This article examines the ideas Popper propounded about the scientific status of the theory of evolution, about whether the theory has a truly scientific character. I first present Popper’s perspective on the criteria that need to be met by the kind of knowledge that claims to be scientific. In the following, I discuss Popper’s basic theses in the philosophy of science and their implications for an assessment of epistemological structure of evolutionary theory. Basic position of evolutionary theory concerning biological reality is roughly described, with a view to bringing out the structure of evolutionary argumentation. I note that while Popper, up to 1977, maintains that the evolutionary theory is a “metaphysical research programme”, a comprehensive and fertile one, he, in his later thought, abandons this claim and attempts to carve out a scientific status for the evolutionary theory, which, however, involves some tensions for the whole logic of the falsificationist strategy.
Reflections on Parmenides’ monism
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2012) Duman, Musa
In this article, I attempt at exploring Parmenides’ understanding of Being, that is, the notion of esti, and the basic function of esti in his overall monistic vision. I also discuss, in this context, the identity of einai and noein, the internal connections between esti and aletheia as well as what he means by the concept of logos. I argue in detail that Parmenides’ monism has a very peculiar character in that he does not speak about one big single entity, but about the uniqueness of Being itself as the ground of all things in the cosmos. In that sense, one can qualify it as non-material monism and, at the same time, as non-ontical monism. But it also contains an identity philosophy, that is, the view that Being can only be spoken of in terms of identity statements. I try to develop the thesis that it is possible to interpret Parmenides’ reflections on esti with respect to the difference between Being itself and a being, (the ontological difference) which, arguably, corresponds to the way Parmenides contrasts esti vis-à-vis plurality and change, while identifying the former with pure being (to eon) and the latter with non-being (to me eon).