Browsing by Author "Turner, Zeynep Talay"

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Emotions and evaluative judgments
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2018-10-30) Turner, Zeynep Talay
There has been an ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such cognitive. Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions are constituted or structured by evaluative judgments, provide us with very rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay its ethical dimension. In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus on compassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments this is not necessarily a one-sided one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment (Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I am interested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of accountability.
Korsgaard on self-constitution
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2017-02-28) Turner, Zeynep Talay
Christine Korsgaard claims that Kantian moral law means the law of selfconstitution and that unless we fully understand what self-constitution means in Kant, we cannot comprehend Kantian morality. Korsgaard’s idea of selfconstitution is based on the idea that the unity of an action and the unity of an agent are not detachable. In this paper, I will examine Korsgaard’s Kantian notion of the self, and, correspondingly, her idea of a good action. However, in doing so, I will claim that her account of the self begins from an assumption, that is the mind is transparent, in other words, we are completely aware of our desires, motives and inclinations.
Nietzsche and Spinoza: Thinking freedom
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2016) Turner, Zeynep Talay
Nietzsche’s concept of freedom is premised upon a conception of the relationship between freedom and necessity; here I examine that concept of freedom against the background of the philosophy of Spinoza. Both offer powerful accounts of how freedom and necessity might be reconciled; this essay sets out the difference between them by breaking the problem down into those of selfhood, time, reason and culture. It is concluded that for Nietzsche freedom is always premised upon a relationship of the self to itself, whereas for Spinoza it devolves on a relationship between self and others.