2007 Güz Sayı 9

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11452/16359

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    Can we survive drinking from the River Lethe?
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2007) Erhart, Itır
    The advocates of the Psychological Account daim that our psychological properties like memory and character traits are essential to us, that we would cease to be if we were to lose them. In this paper I will discuss an undesirable consequence of this widely accepted account, namely, branching. Some of the defenders of the Psychological Account try to solve the branching problem by denying the importance of identity or by denying the eıdstence of three-dimensional objects. I will argue that if we adopl animalism this problem can be solved without giving up such intuitions. I will also daim that we can survive total, irreversible amnesia.
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    Heidegger's critique of Western metaphysics
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2007) Mazman, Ayça
    This paper aims at clarifying Heidegger’s critique of modernity and notices his exceptional approach to metaphysics in general and to the relationship between Being and being specifically. In doing so. I will give a brief explanation about what comes to our mind when we consider modernity. Later in the paper, I will make an effort to elucidate Heidegger's critique of modernity and his mystical tendency to free himself from the problematic situations that modernity faces. I am going to make use of Heideggerian interpretations of Leibniz's the Principle of Reason and the Principle of ldentity and his analysis of these principles in the light of his ideas that are prone to be the beginning of post-modernity. Lastly, I will seek Heidegger's metaphysical view on Being as the ground or abyss.
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    On our knowledge of real existence in Locke
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2007) Öztürk, Fatih
    A common criticism of Locke's theory of knowledge is that Locke's account of knowledge of existence stands in "formal contradiction" with his general defınition of knowledge. But some Locke scholars have attempted to defend Locke by reinterpreting either Locke's phrase "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our ideas" or his characterization of existential knowledge, or his general definition of knowledge. In this paper, I argue that these attempts fail to resolve the apparent inconsistency in Locke' s epistemology.