2018 Sayı 31

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11452/13286

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    Between form and sentiment: Hume’s standard of taste
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2018-10-30) Şenkaya, Coşkun
    In this article, our aim is to give an account of Hume’s way of establishing the conformity between objective and subjective aspects of judgments of taste. In this respect, we give a reading of his “On the standard of Taste” that is based on his more general theory of objectivity. We argue that his account of the relation between the sentiment of beauty and general rules of aesthetic evaluation is an extension of his association-based account of cognition and that he relies on the threefold structure of it to relate and combine the considerations of subjective sentiment with those of objective standards of beauty and that it is only because he allows a kind of sensible reflection that he can argue for the possibility of such a relation and combination.
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    Emotions and evaluative judgments
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2018-10-30) Turner, Zeynep Talay
    There has been an ongoing debate on whether emotions are evaluative judgments, and as such cognitive. Though philosophers, who commit themselves to the idea that emotions are constituted or structured by evaluative judgments, provide us with very rich accounts of the nature of emotions, they downplay its ethical dimension. In order to correct this we should focus on particular emotions. Here I focus on compassion and conclude that though there is an intrinsic relationship between emotions and evaluative judgments this is not necessarily a one-sided one. Finally, I claim that any suspension of judgment (Arendt on Eichmann) can lead to a state of indifference, or an emotion-free state. And here I am interested in the ethical consequences of such a state, namely that with the suspension of judgment and accordingly of emotions, it is much easier for someone to avoid any moral action, and accordingly any sense of accountability.
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    Machiavelli’s republican philosophy
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2018-10-30) Demiryol, Gaye İlhan
    Is Machiavelli a teacher of evil, a defender of absolute, despotic rule? Or is he really a republican thinker as he appears to be in The Discourses? This article presents Machiavelli as a republican thinker. The contention of the article is that Machiavelli throughout his life expressed a preference for the republic as the best government despite his views expressed in his controversial work, The Prince. The article demonstrates that when Machiavelli’s life and the political atmosphere of his time are taken into consideration, The Prince fits in with the republican account of Machiavelli’s life-work.
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    The trouble of misrepresentation in Dretske’s information-theoretic account
    (Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2018-10-30) Gökel, Nazım
    The 20th century has been the era for the rise and development of naturalist theories. With the combination of the linguistic turn and side-effects of the positivist approach, philosophers began to rethink and offer naturalist solutions to some of the chronic debates about the nature of language and mind. In Knowledge and The Flow of Information, Fred Dretske proposed a naturalist account for knowledge and representation. According to him, the information-theoretic account satisfies the requirements of naturalism in both epistemology and the philosophy of mind. Not only it does bring forth a new perspective, he believes that it also presents a new way of dealing with the problem of misrepresentation in the contemporary literature. In this work, first I will provide a brief presentation of Dretske’s account of information and representation. Afterwards, I will present how he deals with the issue of misrepresentation. In the end, I will explain the reasons for the failures in his solution. In particular, I will argue for the claim that (i) not only his account fails to solve the problem of misrepresentation, (ii) but it also fails in one of the requirements of naturalism.