2004 Cilt 5 Sayı 6

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The defense of externalism about reasons from a new perspective
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2004-06-01) Doğan, Aysel
Some philosophers contend that people who accept certain moral judgments act in accordance with these judgments, and that it is odd for people to accept certain moral judgments and yet to be entirely indifferent as to acting on these judgments. According to these philosophers, moral considerations people hold motivate them to act in certain ways. Nevertheless, it seems possible for people to be indifferent to moral judgments they believe while acting. This is the main focus of the objection externalists raised against internalist claims just mentioned. I think that externalists are on the right track in criticizing the internalist contention that the connection between holding a moral belief and motivation to act is necessary. Accepting a moral principle may not have any corresponding motivation to act on the relevant principle. The arguments brought against internalism within the traditional reason/passion framework are not, however, strong enough to defeat it conclusively. Instead of the dualistic framework, I propose a new perspective based on a triadic division of soul, and the idea of autonomy of will, which I believe, help us definitely condemn internalism.