2014 Sayı 23

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11452/13050

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Epistemic defeat, deontology and internalism
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Öztürk, Fatih Sultan Mehmet
What, on the view of many epistemologists, underlies the rationale for internalism is the deontological thought that epistemic justification proceeds in terms of how well our believing that p stands vis-à-vis relevant epistemic duties. However, in “Deontology and Defeat”, Bergmann argues that the view that justification is to be analyzed in deontic terms does not motivate internalism, as many are inclined to suppose. I argue that Bergmann’s argument fails to show this, for the reason that his argument is based on equating S’s belief that his second-order belief that p is epistemically irrational with the notion of epistemic defeat, the presence of which is sufficient but not necessary for epistemic irrationality.
Is metaphysics a feasible philosophical option?
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Çüçen, A. Kadir; Uludağ Üniversitesi/Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi/Felsefe Bölümü.
Before attempting to answer our primary question “is metaphysics a feasible philosophical option?”, I believe that it is necessary to explain and to discuss what the nature of philosophy is, and how it differs from science because my assumption that metaphysics is a feasible philosophical option will get its meaning by showing that metaphysics differs from science as well as philosophy differs from science; furthermore, it would be shown that metaphysics differs from the other options of philosophy. Therefore, in this paper, three concepts will be examined and compared with each other: Philosophy, science, and metaphysics.
Perception and time-experience in Merleau-Ponty and Bergson
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Tapınç, Merve Rümeysa
Both Merleau-Ponty and Bergson underlined the significance of perception and temporal aspect of the subject. However, their account significantly differs. For Merleau-Ponty, the present has priority over past and future, as the subject perceives, acts, and exists in the “present”. Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on the priority of the present depends mostly on his prioritizing of perception and the acting subject. Bergson, on the other hand, considers perception in a relation to memory and present in a relation to duration, thus he emphasizes the possibility of organization and dis-organization of habit-world through varying degrees of repetition of useful memory-images. By showing duration as the condition of possibility for the experience of intuition, Bergson reveals the possibility of reversing habitual way of perceiving things.
The question of Man-Citizen Cooperation in the Declaration of Rights of 1789 from a Marxian perspective
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Aktaş, Melis
The Declaration of Rights of 1789 has been always regarded as a gain of “rights” in the domains of freedom, equality and right of property in the history of man. While we find within it “Man” and “Citizen” as the keywords we usually ignore what these are actually standing for. In fact this division of “Man” and “Citizen” is nothing but an affirmation of capitalism offering people to lead two separate lives in two distinct realms. This in turn gives us the possibility to come across the abstract “Man” covering up its being the bourgeois himself in reality along with the legal term “Citizen” infused with morality, introduced as if in a justification of his demand for the rights. And just there we find Marx who in his way puts an end to the dissimulation in question. So this work aims, in the line of Marx, an uncovering of the identities of the “Man” and “Citizen” in the declaration.
A reading essay on Hegel’s view of right
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Becermen, Metin; Uludağ Üniversitesi/Fen-Edebiyat Fakültesi/Felsefe Bölümü.
In this study, Hegel’s view of right shall be comprehensively taken in hand which Hegel had mentioned in his Philosophy of Right and the concept of the constitutional state idea shall be emphasized in reference to the present problems pursuant to Hegel’s judgments. In this regard, to what extent the forming of a state which is subject to the constitution can provide opportunities for us to cope with the existing problems shall be tried to put forward. Primarily, the concept of universal put forth by Hegel shall be addressed and the importance of thinking upon the possibility of a universal right shall be emphasized. Later on, Hegel’s approach towards right shall be explained, thus creating the framework of the concept of right. Lastly, an evaluation shall be carried out depending on Hegel’s ideas and what meanings of Hegel’s statements which may hold in today’s world shall be tried to set forth.
What is wrong with concurrentism?
(Uludağ Üniversitesi, 2014) Muhtaroğlu, Nazif
Concurrentism and occasionalism are two principal theistic approaches to the nature of divine causality. Whereas the former affirms the causal efficacy of created beings along with the continuous action of God, the latter explicitly denies any causality to finite beings and considers God to be the only genuine causal agent. In “What is Wrong with Occasionalism?” Katherin A. Rogers examines the implications of these theories in relation to the following topics: our knowledge about the external world, the intelligibility of core ontological concepts and human free will together with moral responsibility. What she concludes from her analysis is that occasionalism has problematic implications with respect to these three points and concurrentism is superior to occasionalism in responding to the problems occasionalism faces in this context. In this paper, contrary to Rogers’, I argue that Rogers’ criticisms of occasionalism are in principle applicable to concurrentism and when they are applied, this theory faces more troubles than occasionalism has faced.

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